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Summary  findings
Drawing on experience with direct income-support  Finally, as with many types of support, the lion's share
programs recently introduced in the European Union,  of support may go not to the target group  most in need
Mexico, and the United States, Baffes and Meerman  of support but to large producers.
highlight problems that may arise when a developing  It is important to remember what a direct income-
economy's agricultural sector moves from price-based  support mechanism does and does not do. Although it
subsidies to income support programs.  increases the income of subsistence landholders, it is not
They conclude that income-support programs, despite  supposed to be a poverty reduction program. Nor is it
their theoretical appeal, have many shortcomings and  supposed to be an investment program (as there is no
that developing countries may lack the support  provision for where and how the money will be spent).
mechanisms needed to make them effective.  And because of its association with lower producer
The consequences of delinking support from current  prices, it is not expected to induce sectoral growth.
production  decisions, even though fully expected, may  Instead,  it is a transitional income-redistribution
be perceived as negative. Producers will undoubtedly  mechanism that could eventually transform agriculture
face greater variation in prices and, as the ratio of output  into a fully liberalized sector that helps allocate resources
to input prices will be lower, a negative supply response  more efficiently. And because it is linked to an asset -
for the crops affected may in turn  reduce demand for  land - the lion's share of the payments will inevitably go
agricultural labor.  to large farmers, subject to an upper limit (if such is in
place).
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SUMMARY:  Drawing from the experience of the direct income support programs recently
introduced in the European Union, Mexico, and the U.S., this paper highlights problems that may
arise when the agricultural sector of a developing economy moves from price-based
subsidization to less distorted income support. It concludes that, despite their theoretical appeal,
such programs have many shortcomings; moreover developing countries may lack the necessary
supporting arrangements needed to make such programs effective.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World
Bank.  The authors would like to thank Adolfo Brizzi, Bruce Gardner, Louise Cord, Junichi
Goto, Tassos Haniotis, and Alberto Valdes for valuable comments on an earlier draft.  The paper
has also greatly benefited from a discussion by participants at a World Bank workshop on
February 4, 1997.1.  Introduction
Pricing policies play a vital role in the performance of agriculture. But they have often been
destructive of economic development (World Bank, 1986; Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Krueger et
al., 1992; Meerman, 1997). In response, many countries have undertaken structural reforms that
aim to revitalize production by liberalizing prices and integrating them with those of the world
economy.  Moreover, responding to commitments made under the recently completed Uruguay
round of GATT as well as other multilateral and regional arrangements, more countries are
expected to embark on similar price and trade reforms.  For example, developing countries are
committed to reducing average distorting price supports by 13% in 10 years (Valdes and
McCalla, 1997). This paper focuses on the problems that may be encountered when a country
moves from price-based subsidization to direct income support.
Contrary to the common belief that industrial countries protect agriculture while
developing ones tax it, some developing countries protect, either the sector as a whole, or
specific sub-sectors. In a study concerning eight Latin American countries, Valdes (1996) found
that, on average Chile, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic protect agriculture while Brazil
mildly protects it.  Some countries (Argentina, Equador, Paraguay, and Uruguay) protect only
certain subsectors (cotton in Paraguay, wheat in Uruguay, etc.).  Over 1989-92, Nigeria protected
wheat and coarse grains by maintaining prices at an average of 82% and 92% above the adjusted
world market price.  Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia protected the same commodities at a
combined average of 34% and 13%; Mexico's  effective tariff equivalents for wheat and coarse
grains were 55% and 69% above world prices in 1989-93 (Ingco, 1995). Extremely high
production-supporting subsidies in the agricultural sectors of former centrally planned economies
were the rule (Brooks, 1993).
Price subsidization of agricultural inputs, including fertilizer, irrigation, seeds, electricity,
credit, and insurance has been common practice in developing countries.  For example, Knudsen
et al. (1990) report that in the early and mid-1980s, in Sri Lanka and Turkey fertilizer subsidies
cost about 1% of the total GDP.  Less, but still considerable fertilizer subsidies were present in
Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gambia, and Tanzania ranging between 50% to 100% of the market price
of fertilizer.
1Depending on whether agriculture has been subsidized or taxed, the reforms will lead to
different consequences for stakeholders and hence to resistance by different political forces.
Removal of a commodity tax will be welcomed by producers but is likely to find resistance by
the treasury or any other group that has benefited from the tax.  Removal of a subsidy is likely to
meet very strong resistance from producers if the expected reduction in receipts threatens the
profitability, or even viability, of their production.1
To check such adamant political opposition, while also recognizing that removal of
subsidies will substantially reduce producers'  income, some governments have attempted to
replace price-distorting subsidies by direct income-support mechanisms that make current
production decisions independent of, or less dependent on, support prices.  Ideally, they are
allocatively non-distortionary.  Moreover, because they compensate for the loss of income, they
are politically feasible and make reform possible. 2
In theory, replacing price support by a lump-sum transfer is a win-win outcome and thus
an attractive policy option. Ideally, producers receive about the same income as before; the
treasury is no worse off as it does not spend any more than it did before; and since resources are
reallocated more productively, the economy as a whole should become better off. 3
Analysis of three existing cases, however, raises some important questions.  Drawing
from the experience of the support programs introduced in the European Union (EU) in 1993,
Mexico in 1994, and the U.S. in 1996, this paper highlights problems that may arise when the
agricultural sector moves from price-based subsidization toward direct income-support
compensation. In developing countries these problems may be severe. The income-support
mechanism may be misplaced, or the entire reform process may be put in jeopardy.
2.  The European Union, Mexican, and U.S. Programs
On May 22, 1992, the EU member states agreed to reform a significant part of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP, Commission of the EU, 1993).4 In 1993, the EU reduced support prices
of grains, oilseeds, and pulses and began to compensate producers by direct payments - based on
their past acreage in these crops - in conjunction with measures limiting the area for current
production (Table 1). Because of the reform, producer prices for these crops have declined by a
third since 1993.
2In 1994, Mexico's PROCAMPO (Programa Nacional de Modemizacion del Campo), a new
farm support program, was introduced (World Bank, 1995; SARH) to provide income support to
grain and oilseed producers (corresponding to 90% of all Mexican farmers).  It replaced a system
of administered or so-called guarantee prices which had shifted production to those crops with
the highest degree of relative protection, rather than with the highest profitability according to
world prices.  The poorest peasants did not benefit from guarantee prices as they hardly produced
for market.  In contrast, PROCAMPO does not support production of specific commodities, but
farmers' income.  Under PROCAMPO, prices of the nine crops in the program have become - in
law at least - market driven or autonomous. Hence, production and trade should become less
distorted.  PROCAMPO also is distributionally more attractive than the earlier guarantee price-
support because poor subsistence farmers are eligible for payments and there is a ceiling of 100
hectares on the amount of land that any single farmer can use to justify payments (Table 1).
On April 4, 1996, the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act became
law, after the longest farm-bill debate in U.S. congressional history (USDA,  1996).  FAIR removed
the link between income support payments and farm prices by providing "production flexibility
contract payments" for a number of crops.  Participant producers receive these payments as a
function of the amount of land registered for government support payments in earlier years.
Hence, the payments are independent of current production decisions.  The payments are fixed
annually at a declining rate and under current legislation will end after seven years (Table 1). In
the past, payments closed the gap between U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) target and
market prices.  Today, farmers have far greater flexibility to make planting decisions.  Annual
acreage idling required as part of the previous support programs has been eliminated and
producers are now free to plant any crops on the former "contract acres", except fruits and
vegetables.  Hence, producers depend more heavily on the market and also bear greater risk from
increased price variability. 5
3.  Assessment of the Programs
All three programs are similar in their explicit goal of delinking income support from current
production decisions and in moving toward market-driven prices.  On efficiency grounds the
three income support schemes are among the less distortionary agricultural income-redistribution
3Table 1:  Characteristics of Agricultural Support Programs: Mexico, U.S., and EU
Mexico: PROCAMPO  U.S.: FAIR  EU:  CAP  Reform
Objective  compensate  producers  for  compensate  producers  for  compensate  producers  for
elimination  of guarantee  elimination  of deficiency  reduction  in support  prices
prices  on support  crops  payments
Implemented  1994  1996  1993
Payment  basis  average  acreage  in support  acreage  that received  average  acreage in support
crops during 1991-93  deficiency  payments  in any  crops during 1989-91
of the past 5 years
Support  wheat,  maize,  sorghum,  wheat,  maize,  sorghum,  wheat,  maize,  barley, rye,
products  barley,  rice, cotton, beans,  barley,  rice, cotton, oats  oats, rape seed, sunflower,
soybeans,  safflower  soybeans,  dried pulses,
beans, tobacco,  beef, and
sheepmeat
Time  profile  . first 10  years fixed in real  declining  in real terms;  fixed in nominal terms; no
terms; declining  in final 5  program  lapses after 7  expiration  date
years; 15 years total  years, unless  extended
Payment  limits  $6,700  per farm  $40,000  per farm  no upper limit
Restrictions  on  land should  be allocated  to  land should  be kept in  land should  be allocated  to
the use of  support-crops  (this  agricultural  uses but cannot  support-crops  while large
support-crops  requirement  was added  be allocated  to fruits and  producers  must set aside  a
land  after the introduction  of  vegetables;  must comply  predetermined  level of
the program;  since 1996  with existing  conservation  support-crops  land
the requirement  became  plans
less restrictive  since land
can be allocated  to other in  i
agricultural  uses)
Otherfeatures  "negotiated"  prices in  non-recourse  commodity  support prices  continue  for
effect for the first 2 years  loans are retained in  cereals at lower level
of the program  (transition  modified  formn
period);  floor prices  for
maize  and beans are
retained
NOTES: The  upper  limit  for PROCAMPO  payments  was  100  hectares  while  the  per hectare  payment  is currently
N$484,  giving  approximately  US$6,700  (at  7.2  N$/US$).  Following  the 1994  devaluation  PROCAMPO  payments
were  not fully  adjusted  to inflation.
SOURCE: World  Bank  (1995)  and  SARH for  PROCAMPO;  USDA  (1996)  for  FAIR; and  Commission  of the
European  Communities  (1993)  for  the  CAP Reform.
mechanisms.  All three programs promote allocative efficiency in that quantity produced and
price received are - in varying degrees - made independent of the amount of support.
4Since the amount of support in the new programs depends on land used for past
agricultural production, large farmers will receive most of the support.  In an industrial country
this may be more-or-less an acceptable practice since farmers are perceived to have lower
standards of living than other citizens. This perception is clearly the case in a number of OECD
countries where one of the most commonly declared objective of agricultural policy is "[a]
satisfactory and equitable standard of living for farmers" (Winters, p. 241).  However, in many
developing countries (especially in South Asia and Latin America) this will normally be a less
appropriate criterion, since land is not equally distributed:  a few with relatively high income
own most land, while most farmers own little or even no land whatsoever.
Such programs may also promote equity in developing countries where poverty and
degree of subsistence production have strong positive correlation. Under such a program, poor,
subsistence, but land-owning producers are better-off because they can auto-consume the
previously subsidized commodities and receive cash payments at the same time (see Table 2).
For example, Mexican farmers who own less than two hectares of land receive more than 8% of
PROCAMPO payments, although they have historically marketed very little (Deininger and
Heinegg, 1995). This contrasts favorably with the situation where subsidies apply only to the
traded portion of the commodity.
On efficiency grounds, all three programs are less than ideal in the sense that the use of
land is not entirely delinked from the program.  CAP reform requires that the land remains in
production of the crops eligible for support and also producers must set aside (i.e., hold out of
production) a predetermined level of support-crops land; PROCAMPO is less restrictive in that it
allows a wider variety of crops to be cultivated under the program; FAIR requires that land should
be kept in agricultural uses but it cannot be used for fruits and vegetables while producers must
also comply with existing conservation plans.  These restrictions on land use reduce allocative
efficiency.  In developing countries they may also pose implementation problems since
monitoring compliance on cultivation restrictions would be very complicated, especially in areas
where the average farm size is small. Moreover, monitoring such restrictions may lead to
corruption.
The fiscal costs of the programs can be problematic.  Thus far, two of the programs have
been more costly than the programs they replace - evaluated at prices prevailing at the time of
5their implementation.  In the U.S. the cost of the program in 1996-97 will be about $US 5.5
billion, as opposed to $US 4.2 billion spent in 1994-95 for deficiency-payments (USDA,  1996).
In Mexico the introduction of PROCAMPO  almost doubled the transfers to the agricultural sector
- from N$ 6.4 billion in 1993 to N$ 11.7 billion in 1994-  (SARH).6 Moreover, if the programs
start out expensive, ceteris paribus, their fiscal cost will always remain high because they are
independent of world price.
Ex post, however, the fiscal cost of the new program compared to what the fiscal cost
would have been under the old price-support program, depends on actual world prices.  Under
high world prices, the transfers to farmers due to price-supports would be low or even cease.  For
example, in the U.S., because of the 1996 boom in grain prices, support based on deficiency
payments would have been $US 1 to 2 billion - a fraction of the $US 5.5 billion under the FAIR
act.  Under low world prices, price subsidies would be higher, making the new program "a
bargain."
Increased farmer intra-season risk is another consequence of income support programs.
Replacement of stable support or guarantee prices by direct income transfers exposes producers
to the higher risk of more volatile prices.  The shock from the exposure to risk would be more
prevalent in countries where the government set panterritorial and panseasonal prices than in
countries with protection, such as subsidies per output unit, floor prices, possibly non-tariff
barriers, and import tariffs.  Moreover, the risk factor is expected to be more consequential in
developing countries where producers and traders do not have direct (or even indirect) access to
hedging instruments such as forward and futures exchanges.
Ideally, price and trade reforms are Pareto-improvements that induce growth in the
overall economy through better resource allocation.  But, following the removal of protection,
agricultural growth is likely to be reduced.  Lower prices reduce investment and accelerate
labor's exit from agriculture. Hence, agricultural supply response is expected to be negative.
There is some evidence that the reforms undertaken by the Mexican government in the late 1980s
and early 1990s (including the implementation of PROCAMPO)  on balance reduced the
profitability of the crop sector (Baffes, 1997; World Bank, 1996).7 Moreover, since contraction
of the sector will inevitably cause reduction in the demand for farm labor, the income of landless
farm workers may decline (at least in the short run), although they may benefit to the degree that
6the programs reduce the prices of food which they purchase.
It is important thus to be aware of these consequences early on as the failure of the
reforms to induce supply response and increase demand for labor, at least in the short run, may
lend to confusion and resistance that could jeopardize the reform process.
4.  The Mexican Experience
Mexico was not adequately prepared for implementing the new income support scheme.  The
program was announced first and the registration of eligible producers and the amount of land
covered by the program followed with a substantial lag.  This sequencing caused an important
moral hazard as many farmers apparently reacted by increasing the amount of land in production
of the eligible commodities so as to increase future program-payments.  So, the immediate
effects of announcing the income support scheme may have been the opposite of those desired.
Rather than moving resources to more efficient uses, the scheme, temporarily at least, moved
resources into production that was already excessive.  Moreover, because land rights among
land-owners, tenants, and share-croppers are unclear, it has often been difficult to determine who
is entitled to the payment. 8
Government credibility was also an issue.  Initially, some producers were either unaware
or did not believe that the government would implement the program.  Instead, they feared
taxation and consequently under-reported land allocated to eligible commodities. 9 Furthermore,
the fact that initially PROCAMPO  was to delink payments from current use of land but later
required that land continue to be allocated to the eligible crops, may have further discredited the
government.  Following 1996, however, the government has increased the number of eligible
crops while farmers have always been free to vary the production mix of eligible crops.
In Mexico, the macro-economic environment also played an important role.  Before the
1994 devaluation, most grains in Mexico were highly protected through import controls. After
the devaluation, while crop prices continued at close to the same levels as before in domestic
currency terms, there was far less protection when compared to world prices; for some crops,
domestic prices were even higher than world ones.  Although prices of tradable inputs also
increased, to a large degree one may argue the devaluation substituted for PROCAMPO.
A sound macro-economic environment can also support the transition in making possible
7a liberal trade regime that enables producers and traders to hedge in forward and futures markets
to alleviate short term risk arising from price variability.  The hedge can be achieved through
exchange rate or interest rate contracts in existing futures exchanges. 10
Performance of markets is another issue.  Mexico's  guarantee prices, i.e., panterritorial
and panseasonal target prices supported by public purchase, storage, and transport of the
commodities plus quantitative import restrictions, effectively displaced the notion of the
autonomous market.  The less regulated markets that are replacing the earlier system may still be
rather underdeveloped and inefficient.  In Mexico moving from guarantee prices to a market
economy is more complicated than in countries with a strong tradition of competitive commodity
markets.
5.  Towards a Successful Transition
Even though the three programs are a move in the right direction, as indicated in the Box, they
could have been more effective in several ways.
A - Shortcomings of existing income support programs
. Restrictions on the use of land
. Fiscal costs
*  No explicit end to support
. Incomplete coverage
B - Developing-country institutions which may not be supportive
•  National land registration
*  Land-tenure rules
o  Government credibility
*  Macroeconomic environment
o  Commodity markets
Restrictions on Land-Use.  With the exception of environmental considerations and
provisions to set land aside, the main justification for restrictions on land-use is to ensure that
program payments go only to bona fide farmers - as it is difficult to bring support to non-
producers.  Nevertheless, one important social benefit for replacing price-based subsidization by
a income support program is to encourage resources to be used as relative prices and comparative
advantage dictate.  Were land fully freed, the resulting improvement in resource allocation would
8probably offset the increase in fiscal burden, if any, and make the change a clear Pareto-
improvement.
Credit with its associated positive impact on investment is another reason for not
imposing any restrictions on the use of land. Future payments under the income support scheme
could be used as credit collateral or sold outright as an asset.  However, since it is unlikely that
the lending institutions would have the capacity (and authority) to enforce the restrictions on the
use of land, expected program-payments cannot be used as collateral.  Finally, enforcement of
restrictions on land-use entails careful, and in some countries relatively expensive, administrative
measures.  In Mexico, for example, the majority of extension workers are in effect working for
PROCAMPO  by spending their time monitoring the enforcement of restrictions on land-use.
Fiscal Costs. It is clear that fiscal costs of the programs should not exceed the costs of
the programs they replace. Furthermore, if world prices are high (as were, for example, grain
prices in 1996), producers not only receive these high prices, but they are also financed by the
program thus resulting in excess burden to taxpayers - who, as consumers pay high prices and as
taxpayer's  are burdened with the program's costs.  To circumvent the undesirable double-
taxation and hence make the program equitable from a producer-consumer-taxpayer perspective,
rather than being fixed, payments should be linked to world prices so that during periods of high
world prices producers receive offsetting lower income-support and vice-versa.  In addition,
rather than having uniform level of per hectare support, a declining index may be applied.  For
example, the first 10 hectares receive full support, say $1  00/hectare, the next 10 hectares receive
less support, say $50/hectare, and so on, effectively increasing the relative support to small
producers and hence enhancing the poverty effect of the program.11
Obviously, limits in terms of maximum acreage eligible for income support are an
equitable devise for containing fiscal costs. Equally obviously, the limits will reduce support to
larger producers.  As can be seen in Table 2, above-average-yield large producers are definitely
relative losers due to the transition.  Some of these producers are also likely to be powerful and
may seek "compensation" by demanding high eligibility limits.
Time Profile.  To what extent the programs are transitional mechanisms is clearly a
political question.  While PROCAMPO  states that it will be phased out in 15 years and that world
prices will then prevail in the sector, FAIR' s language leaves the question of support after the
9seven-year period wide open.  Thus far, the CAP is not subject to a time profile.  Nevertheless, it
is important to be clear that the final objective is to eliminate special supports to farmers and thus
the programs should "wind down" to an explicit expiration date.  It should be emphasized here,
however, that the existence of an explicit time profile no longer renders such programs as Pareto
improvement, for the simple reason that producers who previously were receiving support, no
longer do and hence they are worse off.
Comprehensiveness.  The three programs discussed here are far from comprehensive.
The FAIR does not apply to sugar, tobacco, peanuts, and milk, all of which are heavily protected
in ways that seriously misallocate resources.  PROCAMPO is restricted to 9 commodities while it
leaves price floors for two commodities (maize and beans).  CAP's  reform, although it covers a
wide variety of crops, including some livestock, leaves price supports in place.
Table 2:  Relative Gain/Loss Matrix from New Programs by Producer Groups
Below average yield  Above average yield
Small (subsistence)  producers  Gain  Gain
Producers below eligibility limit  Gain  .
Producers above eligibility limit  Loss
NOTES:  Assuming direct income-support programs with costs equal to preceding price-support programs, "Gain"
implies that the producer receives more income under the direct income support while "Loss" implies the reverse;
"?" means that the outcome is undetermined.  In Mexico the eligibility limit is the amount corresponding to 100
hectares while in the U.S. it is $40,000.  There is no EU eligibility limit.
Institutional Issues.  The above shortcomings apply in both developed and developing
countries.  However, weak supporting institutions are more likely to be a problem in developing
countries (see Box).  For example, to ensure fairly and timely producer payments, a national land
registry should exist before the announcement of the program.  Furthermore, government must
have policy credibility, if producers are to react as desired.  The macro-economic environment,
above all the exchange rate should be adequate and stable.  In some cases eliminating currency
overvaluation may make it possible to also eliminate protection without fiscal compensation.  If
substantial devaluation is likely, a better approach to eliminating price supports may be to make
explicit the benefits to farmers that may result from devaluation and include elimination of
agricultural price-supports as part of the macroeconomic reform package.  Finally, efficient and
10integrated  commodity  markets  are needed  to ensure  a smooth  transition.
"Who receives  the payment"  may also be an issue,  particularly  in developing  countries
where land  tenure  rights are very much in flux. Consider  a case where  the land  has been
operated  by a tenant  for the entire  period on which  the payments  are based. If support  is based
on land previously  allocated  to supported  crops,  the land  owner  will claim  the payments. On
equally valid grounds,  the tenant  may claim the payments  since  if it was not for his cultivation,
the land would  not have been eligible  for support. Resolving  the "who-receives-the-payment"
issue will often complicate  the implementation  process.
Thus, in the absence  of land-tenure  rights,  direct income support  may not be the
appropriate  route to reform. Moreover,  appropriate  preparation  of a transition  program  may
require an extensive  survey  of the rural  economy  in order  to identify  the distribution  of
owner/non-owner  operated  farms. The survey  will indicate  not only the technical  feasibility  of
the program,  but may also give  useful information  on other  aspects  such as identification  of the
distribution  of farm size,  yields, and commodities  produced. Such information  may  be necessary
to design equitable  and affordable  programs,  that are politically  acceptable.
6.  Concluding Remarks
In designing  income-support  programs  it is well  to keep  in mind  that delinking  support  from
current  production  decisions  implies consequences  which, even  though fully expected,  are likely
to be perceived  as "negative". Producers  will undoubtedly  face higher  risk from increased  price
variability. As the ratio of output  to input prices  will be lower,  negative  supply  response  in
agriculture  should  be expected  for the crops in question  which in turn may reduce  demand  for
agricultural  labor. Finally, as is the case  with other  types of support,  many  large producers  who
will receive  the lion's share  of the support  may not be in the desired  target group;  that is, those
most in need of support  during the transition  period. The latter problem  has been well
recognized  and is one of the complicating  factors  behind  attempts  to further  reforming  the CAP.
It is unlikely  that the conditions  and requirements  discussed  earlier  will be fully  met,
particularly  in the developing  countries  that protect  agriculture. Decision-makers  need to be
aware  of these requirements  to ensure design  of feasible  programs,  quite apart from the question
of dealing successfully  with the political  forces  that are involved.
11In conclusion, it is important to recall what a direct income support mechanism does and
does not do.  Despite increasing the income of subsistence land-holders, it is not supposed to be a
poverty reduction program.  As there is no provision on where and how the money will be spent
it is not supposed to be an investment program, either.  Moreover, because of its association with
lower producer prices, it is not expected to induce sectoral growth.  Instead, it is a transitional
income-redistribution mechanism, which could eventually transform agriculture into a fully
liberalized sector that helps resources to be allocated in a more efficient manner.  Furthermore,
because it is linked to an asset - land - the lion 's share of the payments  will inevitably go to
large farmers, subject to an upper limit (if it is in place).
12Endnotes
1  See Winters  (1987, 1989)  and Gardner  (1987, 1990)  for a discussion  of the political  economy  of agricultural
protection.
2  A clarification  concerning  the concepts  of equity  and efficiency  may be helpful. Whether  an income
redistribution  mechanism  should  be in place or not (be it price support,  lump-sum  transfer,  etc.) is an equity
question  in the sense  that  to justify it, the benefiting  group  in the society  is valued  more  than the losing  group  - the
specific  groups  referred  to in this paper are producers  versus  taxpayers  and small  versus large  land-owners.  In
welfare  economics,  the income  redistribution  entails  the assumption  that the "policy  maker"  places  a higher  weight,
say on producers  (see Baffes  (1993) for an exposition  of weighted  utilitarian  functions). The efficiency  argument,
on the other  hand, is centered  around  the following  question:  given that it is desirable  to redistribute  income,  what is
the most efficient  way of doing so? Although  this paper deals  mainly  with  efficiency,  when reference  to equity  is
made, it is explicitly  stated  so.
3  Gardner  (1990,  p. 190)  puts it as follows: "The  existence  of deadweight  losses  from commodity  market
intervention  implies  that losers  should  be able  to compensate  the gainers  a bribe  that exceeds  their surplus  gains,
while  the losers  are better off  paying  the bribe  than enduring  the intervention.  The maximum  size of the net gain is
the deadweight-loss  triangle. The reasoning,  based  on the compensation  principles  mentioned  earlier,  suggests
lump-sum  transfers  as a policy  reform  that provides  a Pareto improvement."  In contrast  to the argument  underlying
this paper,  proponents  of price-support  programs  frequently  justify them in terms of their alleged  promotion  of
"agricultural  efficiency  and competitiveness"  (Winters,  1990,  p. 241).
4  By 1991,  the EU allocated  nearly  one percent  of its GDP  (58 billion  ECUs)  to agriculture,  most of it to support
the CAP. Price  distortions  were extreme. For example,  U.K. wholesale  prices for sugar,  rice, and butter  were
308%, 171%,  and 247% of their respective  world  market  prices  at the wholesale  level (Atkins,  1993,  pp. 85, 87). In
addition  to being expensive,  "[t]he vast bulk of CAP  money goes  to farmers,  many of whom  are well off."
(Financial Times; Friday  January  24, 1997).
5  New Zealand  undertook  substantial  reforms in the agricultural  sector  over  the last 8 years and removed  most
subsidies  without  implementing  an interim  scheme  (Chamberlin,  1996). Japan,  under  the Uruguay  Round
Agreement,  accepted  a minimum  access  (4%-8%  of domestic  consumption)  to foreign  rice. Since such opening-up
of the rice  market  is expected  to lead to a lower  domestic  price of rice (and  therefore  to the decline  in farmers'
income),  the government  enacted  a new law, in the same  Diet  session  as the ratification  of Uruguay  Round,  which
appropriate  more that 6 trillion  yen (about  $U.S. 60 billion)  to take compensatory  measures  to increase  farmers'
income. While  the money  is not for a direct  cash  payment  to the farmers,  it is intended  to increase  farmers' income
indirectly  through  various  measures  including  improvement  of infrastructure  in the rural areas,  enhancement  of
agricultural  technology,  credit,  etc.  (Goto, 1997).
6  Consider  the following  excerpt from SARH  (p. 30, translated  from Spanish)  regarding  the costs of PROCAMPO:
"The  Executive  Power  will submit  to the Chamber  of Deputies  a budget  of N$ 11.7  billion  for PROCAMPO  for
calendar  year 1994. It represents  additional  resources  of N$ 5.3  billion compared  to the transfers  already  allocated
during 1993  to CONASUPO  and ASERCA,  an increase  of 83 percent. This  increase  is an important  effort in that each
urban  citizen  will make an income  transfer  to the rural sector  of 1.45  percent,  compared  to that of 0.79 percent
previously."
7  On a similar  topic,  Jenkins  (1995)  examined  the relationship  between  trade liberalization  and productivity
growth  for Bolivian  manufacturing  and concluded  that  (p. 593): "[T]he  impact  of trade liberalization  on output  has
been negative  for many sectors. Industries  such as spinning  and weaving,  clothing  and footwear,  which  face
substantial  import  competition,  have contracted  since  the mid-eighties."
8  Land  tenure  is one of the most difficult  aspects  of the Mexican  farm  policy. In addition  to private  farms,  there is
a class  of quasi-communal  farms,  the ejidos. Created  under  the Constitution  of 1917,  ejidos guaranteed  all
Mexicans  land rights  through  expropriations  of large landholdings.  The ejido holders  rights  over land and water  use
13were subject  to a number  of restrictions.  Sale or rental  of ejido land  was prohibited;  ejidatarios  could  not hire wage
workers  and they could not be absent  from their farm  for more  than  two years without  losing  their rights. The ejido
system  gave  farmers  little control  in their choice  of inputs  and outputs  (Heath, 1990). In 1992  a reform  in the
Mexican  Constitution  gave ejidatarios  the right to rent and sell land  to outsiders  with  the approval  of a majority  of
ejido  members. Land  can now be pledged  as a collateral.  However,  the titling process  has been slow. de Janvry et
al. (1995)  report that  by early 1995,  only  20 percent  of ejidos  had been  given land titles.
9  Salinger  et al. (1995) write  regarding  government's  credibility  and farmers'  behavior  in Mexico:  "In actual
practice,  however,  due to the fact that  many areas  were first under-reported  (due  to fear of Government  taxation),
then over-reported  compared  with  known  aggregate  areas  from agricultural  censuses,  the final determination  of
eligible  areas  has not yet occurred. In many instances,  eligible  areas  are 'negotiated' at the community  level, and
thus only  bear loose  resemblance  to the objective  three-year  record."
10  In the case  of cotton,  Mexico  guarantees  a minimum  price to farmers  for a predetermined  fee through  the
government  organization  of ASERCA.  The minimum  price is set using  the New York  cotton  futures  exchange. For
a fee, ASERCA  offers a guaranteed  price in US dollars  and hedges  the risk by using fees  to purchase  put options  on
the exchange  for future  delivery  after  the harvest. Should  prices fall, ASERCA  pays the farmer  the difference
between  the prevailing  New York  futures  and guarantee  price. If price  rise instead,  ASERCA  makes  no payment
(Varangis  and Larson, 1996).
11  If the program  is announced  before  the registries  are completed,  such declining  index  may not be as effective
since  farners will have an incentive  to divide  the land among  family  members  and hence  fall in the lower  bracket.
Corporate  farms  can act similarly  by including  more  members. Similar  problems  may arise  with  the upper limit.
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